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THE  FUTURE  OF  HUMAN  RIGHTS  LITIGATION
AFTER KIOBEL
Roger P. Alford *
INTRODUCTION
This Article begins from the premise that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
no longer serves a useful purpose in litigating human rights claims.1  As
others have argued in this issue, that premise may not be correct.2  Assuming
it is, however, one should anticipate that human rights lawyers will pursue
alternative avenues for relief.
As outlined below, there are a surprising number of options available
under federal, state, and foreign law.  The most obvious alternatives are not
necessarily the most effective.  The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),
for example, will be of no value to plaintiffs pursuing claims against corpora-
tions or governments.3  The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) regulates a vast array of unlawful conduct, but has its own
territorial limits.4  State statutes that regulate unfair business practices and
consumer fraud are promising avenues to address secondary harms to
domestic consumers and competitors, but offer no direct relief to human
rights victims.5
The most important alternative avenue is tort law.6  Indeed, one could
say that the future of human rights litigation in the United States depends on
© 2014 Roger P. Alford.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for International and Graduate Programs,
University of Notre Dame School of Law.  J.D. New York University; LL.M. University of
Edinburgh.
1 See infra Part I.
2 See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court
Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1780–88 (2014); William R. Casto, The
ATS Cause of Action Is Sui Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1545, 1563–75 (2014); Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and Concern” the United States:
Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695, 1703–14 (2014); Beth Stephens,
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1538–41 (2014).
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part IV.
6 See infra Part V.
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refashioning human rights claims as state or foreign tort violations.  Almost
every international law violation is also an intentional tort.  Torture is assault
and battery.  Terrorism is wrongful death.  Slavery is false imprisonment.
Rather than pursuing claims for wrongful conduct under the ATS, those
same victims could plead violations of domestic or foreign tort laws.  Courts
seized with such claims should apply choice of law principles to assess the
appropriate tort law to resolve the dispute.  If the United States has a para-
mount interest in addressing the human rights violation, then that likely will
result in the application of domestic tort law.  Otherwise, traditional choice
of law analysis applied in the international human rights context will often
result in the application of foreign tort law.
Other avenues for relief remain untested.  One of the most uncertain
avenues is to plead violations of international law as part of foreign law.7  If
international law has been incorporated into the law of most countries
around the world, it follows that a violation of international law will often
also be a violation of foreign law.  By employing choice of law principles to
invoke foreign law, plaintiffs can pursue international law claims incorpo-
rated into foreign law.  This is most obvious in monist states that directly
apply international law into domestic law.  But even dualist states implement
international law either directly or indirectly.  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co.,8 for example, the plaintiffs could have alleged human rights viola-
tions under Nigerian law because human rights treaties and customary
international law form part of Nigerian law.
Another untested avenue for relief is to plead federal common law viola-
tions of the law of nations in state courts or federal courts exercising foreign
diversity jurisdiction.9  Assuming the statutory presumption against extrater-
ritoriality limits the scope of the ATS and not the underlying federal com-
mon law claims, there is nothing to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing common
law claims elsewhere.  Nor is there anything that prevents state courts from
recognizing international law violations as state common law claims.  Such
claims would not be subject to the statutory presumption against extraterrito-
riality, but would be subject to territorial limits imposed by constitutional and
international law.
Finally, if international law forms part of domestic and foreign law, then
applying the choice of law doctrine of false conflicts would permit courts to
apply the international law that is incorporated into domestic law rather than
the international law that forms part of foreign law.10  In the absence of a
conflict between the potentially applicable foreign law and domestic law, the
forum is free to apply domestic law.  In other words, it is quite plausible that a
federal district court in Kiobel could have applied federal common law claims
alleging violations of the law of nations—not because those common law
claims governed the dispute—but because there was no conflict between that
7 See infra Part VI.
8 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
9 See infra Part VII.
10 See infra Part VIII.
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substantive international law embedded in the common law and the interna-
tional law embedded in Nigerian law.
Part I briefly analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel with partic-
ular attention to the consequences that that decision has for the demise of
ATS litigation.  Part II summarizes the limits of the TVPA and suggests that
such claims will only be viable against foreign government officials with
attachable assets located abroad.  Part III outlines claims under civil RICO
and discusses the divergent territorial limits that courts have imposed since
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.11
Part IV discusses state unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) stat-
utes regulating unfair business practices and consumer fraud.  Those statutes
routinely have been included in human rights litigation in the past, and will
continue to be included following Kiobel.  The presumption against extrater-
ritoriality applies to those statutes, however, resulting in relief for domestic
consumers and competitors, but not for foreign human rights victims.  Part V
discusses the most likely avenue for relief by pleading violations of state or
foreign tort laws.  Whether state or foreign law applies depends on choice of
law principles.  Because the center of gravity for human rights violations is
foreign rather than domestic, foreign tort laws will apply to the typical
human rights claims that were pursued under the ATS.  Part VI follows the
previous Part by suggesting that the invocation of foreign law might also
include the invocation of international law.  Choosing foreign law also means
choosing international law that is incorporated into that law.  Part VII sug-
gests that the common law claims for international law violations recognized
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain12 are not subject to the presumption against extra-
territoriality.  If the statutory presumption only limits the ATS and not the
underlying common law claims, then those claims may be pursued in state
courts or in federal courts exercising foreign diversity jurisdiction.  Finally,
Part VIII concludes with an analysis of the “false conflict” doctrine as applied
to international law claims.  If the same international law forms part of
domestic and foreign law, then the false conflict doctrine would permit
domestic courts to use the international law that forms part of domestic law.
I. KIOBEL AND THE DEMISE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE13
The history of international human rights litigation under the ATS is
well known.14  Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,15 such litigation has become some-
11 130 S. Ct 2869 (2010).
12 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
13 This brief discussion of the demise of the ATS is taken substantially from my most
recent article. See Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of
Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
14 There is extensive commentary on both the history of the ATS and the litigation
that it has spawned. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011); Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney
General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Bradley, Bradford’s Opinion]; Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law,
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thing of a cottage industry, with over 150 cases filed alleging the commission
of a tort in violation of the law of nations.16  For over two decades, interpreta-
tion of the ATS developed without the benefit of Supreme Court review.17
Finally in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain limited the
scope of the ATS, but left the door ajar for further litigation, “subject to vigi-
lant doorkeeping.”18  The central holding of Sosa was that the ATS was a
jurisdictional statute that nonetheless permitted common law causes of
action for torts committed in violation of the “present-day law of nations,”
provided those claims rested on accepted international norms and were
defined with sufficient specificity.19
Since that time, lower courts struggled to answer the many questions
Sosa left unresolved.20  Among the open questions were whether claimants
and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002); William S. Dodge, The Constitu-
tionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687
(2002); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004); William S.
Dodge, Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1045 (2012);
Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System
of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2011); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory
of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006); Carlos M. Va´zquez, Alien Tort Claims
and the Status of Customary International Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 531 (2012); Ryan Goodman
& Derek P. Jinks, Note, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Com-
mon Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
15 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
16 See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and
Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 460 (2011);
Michael Goldhaber, The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort, LAW.COM (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202473215797&sl
return=20140016104130.
17 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Hilao v. Estate
of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzˇic´, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
18 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
19 Id. at 725.  The Court stated that the modern-day international norms must be
accepted by the civilized world and be defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the eighteenth-century paradigms—namely, violations of safe conducts, infringements
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See id. at 715, 725.
20 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
1995 (2013); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009);
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371
(4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 560 U.S. 305 (2010); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th
Cir. 2008); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d
Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
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were required to exhaust local remedies,21 whether alien claims against
aliens were cognizable federal questions,22 whether corporations were ame-
nable to suit under international law,23 whether corporations were liable for
aiding and abetting government misconduct,24 and whether the ATS applied
extraterritorially.25
Finally, last term the Supreme Court in Kiobel issued a landmark decision
that signals the end of the Filartiga human rights revolution.  It did so by
embracing the presumption against extraterritoriality, a presumption
designed to avoid “‘unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.’”26  The Court con-
cluded that nothing in the text, history, and purpose of the statute negated a
presumption against extraterritoriality.27  The text provides no evidence that
Congress intended causes of action to have extraterritorial reach.28  The his-
tory of the statute offers instances in which the statute is applied within the
United States and on the high seas, but little to no support for its application
21 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 829–33; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1024–25; Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 27;
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1096–98 (N.D. Cal. 2008). See generally
Rosica (Rose) Popova, Sarei v. Rio Tinto and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule in the
Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act: Short-Term Justice, but at What Cost?, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL’Y 517 (2007) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for declining to apply the exhaustion of
local remedies principle in Sarei).
22 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 752–55; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 309–10; Taveras v. Taveraz, 477
F.3d 767, 772–77 (6th Cir. 2007); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Sosa,
Federal Question Jurisdiction, and Historical Fidelity, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 15, 16 (2007).
23 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019–25; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,
117 (2d. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of
Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 119–23; see also Julian Ku, Response: Rethinking the Direction of the
Alien Tort Statute, 100 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2219–21 (2012) (discussing legal theories that might
allow parties to sue corporations for violations of international law in U.S. courts despite
“international precedents . . . against corporate liability”); Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of
Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 353, 365–68 (2011) (discussing the evolution of theories with respect to corporate
liability under international law in U.S. courts).
24 See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 748–54; Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 174; Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315;
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 259–60; Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir.
2007).  See generally Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008) (discussing aiding and abetting
as developed in international law).
25 See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 318 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012); Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at
20; Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp.
2d at 1088.
26 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
27 See id. at 1665–69.
28 See id. at 1666 (“The reference to ‘tort’ does not demonstrate that the First Congress
‘necessarily meant’ for those causes of action to reach conduct in the territory of a foreign
sovereign.  In the end, nothing in the text of the ATS evinces the requisite clear indication
of extraterritoriality.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
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on the territory of another sovereign.29  As for the statute’s purpose, the goal
of the statute was not to transform the fledgling country into “the custos
morum of the whole world,” but rather to provide a means for “judicial relief
to foreign officials injured in the United States.”30  Therefore, the Court
held, the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to limit the reach of
the ATS.
As applied to the facts in Kiobel, given that all the relevant conduct
occurred outside the United States, the Court held that the statute did not
reach the plaintiffs’ claims.  As for other claims that “touch and concern the
territory of the United States,” the Court concluded that “they must do so
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”31
The Kiobel decision is complex and confusing, offering scant guidance as
to how lower courts should proceed when claims touch and concern U.S.
territory.  However, unlike the other articles in the issue, the purpose of this
Article is not to analyze Kiobel, but rather to consider the future of human
rights litigation in the United States in light of Kiobel.  The effective result of
Kiobel is to severely limit ATS litigation in the United States.  The old Filartiga
paradigm of using the statute to redress human rights violations of foreign
defendants committed against foreign plaintiffs on foreign soil is dead.32
Because “[m]odern ATS litigation almost always involves conduct that took
place outside the United States,”33 the presumption against extraterritoriality
will foreclose the vast majority of ATS cases.  To be sure, future litigation will
clarify how sufficient the territorial nexus to the United States must be to
rebut the presumption.  Thus far, lower courts have required substantial con-
tact with the territory of the United States to rebut the presumption.34
29 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–69 (“Nor does the historical background against which
the ATS was enacted overcome the presumption against application to conduct in the terri-
tory of another sovereign.”).
30 Id. at 1668 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[T]here is no
indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum
for the enforcement of international norms. . . . The ATS ensured that the United States
could provide a forum for adjudicating such incidents.” Id.
31 Id. at 1669.
32 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
33 Bradley, Bradford’s Opinion, supra note 14, at 512.
34 See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud &
Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Sexual Minori-
ties Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756, at *15 (D. Mass. Aug. 14,
2013); Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *8 (N.D.
Ala. July 25, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 WL
3229720, at *10 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013); see also Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium:
Interpreting “Touch and Concern,” OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/
2013/04/19/kiobel-insta-symposium-interpreting-touch-and-concern (discussing Kiobel’s
reliance on Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. in interpreting when claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality).
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TVPA
With the demise of the ATS, the TVPA is perhaps the most obvious path
for pursuing international human rights litigation in the United States.  The
statute provides:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation—
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for dam-
ages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person
who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.35
The TVPA is broader than the ATS in that it applies extraterritorially36
and permits both U.S. citizens and aliens to bring claims.37  It is narrower
than the ATS in that it only permits claims for acts of torture or extrajudicial
killings committed under color of foreign law, and limits liability to acts com-
mitted by natural persons, excluding corporations, foreign state entities, or
other legal instrumentalities.38
The TVPA has rarely produced results favorable to plaintiffs.39  Foreign
states and foreign state entities are immune from claims of torture or extraju-
dicial killings.40  Because claims may only be brought against individuals act-
ing under color of foreign law, plaintiffs must establish that “the defendants
possessed power under [foreign] law, and that the offending
actions . . . derived from an exercise of that power, or that defendants could
not have undertaken their culpable actions absent such power.”41  Allega-
tions that corporate officers or U.S. government officials conspired with for-
35 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
36 The statute provides for liability for any individual who acts under apparent author-
ity or color of law “of any foreign nation” and includes an exhaustion of remedies require-
ment that requires courts to dismiss a claim if the claimant has not exhausted adequate
and available remedies “in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim
occurred.” Id. § 2(a)–(b); see Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The
Alien Tort Statute’s Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149,
176 (2013) (“If Congress wants to do as it did in the Torture Victim Protection Act and
create detailed, specific conditions for extraterritorial reach, it can do so with regard to the
ATS.”).
37 See Kadic v. Karadzˇic´, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995).
38 See Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(a); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct.
1702, 1707–11 (2012); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009); In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 111–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Schneider v. Kis-
singer, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004).
39 See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
76 (2d ed. 2008) (“As of late 2006, approximately 45 reported decisions included TVPA
claims; about a dozen resulted in final judgments awarding damages . . . .”).
40 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
41 Arar, 585 F.3d at 568.
1756 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
eign governments or facilitated foreign government action will fall short of
the requisite finding that the individual exercised power under the authority
of the foreign state.42
As a practical matter this will limit claims to those brought against indi-
viduals acting under the authority or at the behest of the foreign state, and
will exclude claims against corporate officials that merely conspired or acted
in concert with foreign governments.43  The most common TVPA defendants
are judgment-proof foreign government officials like Americo Pen˜a-Irala.44
For plaintiffs, the most promising defendants are high-ranking foreign gov-
ernment officials with attachable looted assets.45  Corporate officers are far
less likely to be defendants in TVPA litigation.  The likelihood that corporate
officers acted under color of foreign law will be rare,46 and even assuming
they did, pleading that fact as a plausible occurrence will be extraordinarily
difficult in light of heightened federal pleading standards.47
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND RICO
The unlawful pattern of human rights violations raises the prospect of
civil remedies under RICO.  RICO provides treble damages48 for persons
injured by enterprises that commit unlawful conduct through a “pattern of
racketeering.”49  To state a claim under RICO, plaintiffs must allege (1) con-
duct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.50
Any enterprise is potentially liable under RICO if it engages in two or more
predicate acts of racketeering such as wire or mail fraud, immigration fraud,
murder, slave labor, torture, kidnapping, gambling, trafficking, or bribery.51
An “enterprise” is broadly defined to include formal legal entities, such as
42 See id.; Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 41 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 522 F.3d 413
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
43 See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009); Cabello v. Ferna´n-
dez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d
1112, 1148–49 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262,
267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355–56 (N.D. Ga.
2002); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1247–49 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995).
44 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that Pen˜a-Irala
was the Inspector General of Police in Asuncio´n, Paraguay at the time he tortured the
Fila´rtigas); WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
FILARTIGA V. PENA IRALA 18 (2008).
45 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996); Associated
Press, Marcos Faces a Judgment Against Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1990, at B4.
46 See Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *9
(N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013).
47 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
49 Id. § 1962(a).
50 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
51 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1),(4)–(5), 1964.
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corporations and partnerships, as well as individuals or groups who are asso-
ciated in fact.52
Civil RICO claims have been filed in dozens of instances arising out of
alleged human rights abuse.53  Indeed, the facts in Kiobel gave rise to related
litigation alleging RICO violations.54  Those claims are rarely successful
because the presumption against extraterritoriality requires either evidence
of a domestic enterprise or of substantial domestic conduct.  Following Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,55 courts addressing RICO’s extraterritori-
ality fall into two camps: those asserting that RICO’s focus is on the domestic
enterprise and those asserting that RICO’s focus is on the pattern of domes-
tic racketeering activity.56  The Ninth Circuit has focused on “the pattern of
Defendants’ racketeering activity as opposed to the geographic location of
Defendants’ enterprise.”57  Other courts have concluded that RICO does not
apply where the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity
are entirely foreign.58
What remains unclear under either approach is “RICO’s application to
an allegedly domestic enterprise whose effects are felt outside the United
States.”59  Nor is it clear whether “RICO should apply to racketeering activity
abroad that causes effects in the United States on or through a domestic
52 Id. § 1961(4).
53 See, e.g., Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 F.3d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 2012); Saleh v.
Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Tu¨redi v. Coca-Cola Co., 343 F. App’x 623, 624
(2d Cir. 2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1245, 1254,
1267 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2002);
Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
28, 2013); Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *1–3 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 23, 2013); Delgado v. Villanueva, No. 12 Civ. 3113(JMF), 2013 WL 3009649, at
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013); Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
1301–02 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Magnifico v. Villanueva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221–22 (S.D. Fla.
2011); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Corrie v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola
Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
54 See Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd., 335 F. App’x 81, 84 (2d Cir.
2009); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2000).
55 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
56 See United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing cases
from both camps).
57 Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977; see Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 168
(D.D.C. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
58 See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 732
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011
WL 843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); Ceden˜o v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d
471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
59 In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and
Prods. Liab. Litig., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see In re Toyota Motor Corp.
Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d
1180, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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enterprise.”60  Further jurisprudence with respect to these questions is neces-
sary to assess the likely salience of RICO to international human rights viola-
tions.  Regardless, most international human rights cases brought under the
ATS would lack the requisite domestic nexus to overcome RICO’s presump-
tion against extraterritoriality.  Either the collection of actors who are associ-
ated in fact will not constitute a domestic enterprise, or the pattern of
racketeering activity will be more foreign than domestic.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
The overwhelming majority of states have broad prohibitions protecting
consumers against corporations that engage in unfair and deceptive acts and
practices—UDAP statutes.61  These statutes broadly construe unfair and
deceptive behavior to include almost any commercial conduct that harms
consumers, including not only unlawful conduct, but also “immoral, unethi-
cal, oppressive, or unscrupulous” behavior.62  A typical UDAP statute autho-
rizes public and private enforcement through injunctive relief, monetary
damages, attorneys’ fees, and, in some cases, enhanced and punitive dam-
ages.63  In many jurisdictions, there is no obligation to prove knowledge or
intent to deceive, and no obligation to prove consumer reliance.64
Plaintiffs alleging human rights abuse occasionally have included a cause
of action for UDAP violations.65  The most frequent statutory claim connect-
ing international human rights violations with unfair business practices is
based on section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code,
60 William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 695 (2011).  For such a
scenario, see Chevron Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d at 244–45; Magnifico v. Villanueva, 783 F.
Supp. 2d 1217, 1221–22 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
61 See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
THE STATES 11–12 (2009) (stating that forty-three states and the District of Columbia have
broad prohibitions against deceptive practices, while thirty-nine states and the District of
Columbia have broad prohibitions against unfair practices), available at http://www.nclc
.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.
62 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 378
n.50 (August Horvath et al. eds., 2009).
63 See id. at 377, 381–84; T. EVAN SCHAEFFER, DEPOSITION CHECKLISTS AND STRATEGIES
§ 8:05 (2013); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 399 (2007).
64 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 62, at 377, 384; SCHAEFFER, supra
note 63, § 8:01.
65 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1185 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 340 F.
Supp. 2d 494, 501 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Anderman v. Fed. Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp.
2d 1098, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F.
Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal. 2002);
Second Amended Complaint for Tort Damages at 29, Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C07-
02151 CW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2007); Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Dam-
ages at 2, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. BC339737 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2005).
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which defines “unfair competition” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraud-
ulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising.”66  The goal is to protect “consumers and competitors by pro-
moting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.”67
On the basis of this statute, plaintiffs in Doe v. Unocal alleged that when a
California corporation subjected Burmese villagers to forced labor, murder,
rape, and torture in Burma, it constituted unfair business practices within the
meaning of the statute.68  A California superior court agreed, holding that a
section 17200 claim could be “brought in California for injuries occurring
outside of California as long as some of the wrongful conduct occurred
within California,” including simply making “funding policy decisions” within
the state.69  Unocal subsequently settled with a substantial monetary award
for the plaintiffs.70
Similarly, in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., the California Supreme Court addressed
whether Nike could be held liable for misleading statements regarding its
sweatshop labor practices in Asia.71  It concluded that section 17200 creates a
private right of action for violations of other laws that are not otherwise
actionable.72  It also held that “[b]y defining unfair competition to
include . . . any ‘unfair or fraudulent business act or practice,’ the [statute]
sweeps within its scope acts and practices not specifically proscribed by any
other law.”73  Moreover, even if corporate officers make true statements
about their overseas labor practices, those statements are nonetheless action-
able if they are likely to deceive the public.  “[W]hen a corporation, to main-
tain and increase its sales and profits, makes public statements defending
labor practices and working conditions at factories where its products are
made, those public statements . . . may be regulated to prevent consumer
66 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
67 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 883 (Cal. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
68 As alleged in the complaint, “[t]he use of . . . unfair, illegal, and forced labor creates
an unfair business advantage over competitors within California and the United States.”
Complaint at 33, Doe v. Unocal, No. B C237980 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2000).
69 Ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Sum-
mary Adjudication on Each of Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims at 14, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC
237 980, BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 7, 2002), available at http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloud
front.net/sites/default/files/legal/Unocal-Tort-Liability-MSA-Ruling.pdf; see also Churc-
hill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126–27 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explain-
ing that a claim must have some nexus to California in order for the court to have
jurisdiction); Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 28 (1999)
(explaining that the court must analyze choice of law issues to determine whether Califor-
nia law or the laws of other states should govern).
70 See Svetlana Meyerzon Nagiel, Note, An Overlooked Gateway to Victim Compensation:
How States Can Provide a Forum for Human Rights Claims, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133,
139–44 (2007).
71 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
72 See id. at 249.
73 Id. (citation omitted).
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deception.”74 Kasky was limited by state referendum to grant standing to
plaintiffs who have lost money or property, but unfair competition actions
still may be brought as a class action as long as the named plaintiff has suf-
fered an injury in fact.75
Such claims are not based on injuries to the foreign human rights vic-
tims, but rather injuries to competitors or injury to consumers deceived by
corporate misrepresentations regarding its human rights record.76  Human
rights claims are about regulating corporate misconduct in the global supply
chain that causes consumer confusion or unfair competition for competitors
who refrain from unethical conduct.  Consumers will pay significant premi-
ums for assurances that a garment was not manufactured under sweatshop
conditions.77  As the California Supreme Court has put it: “To some consum-
ers, processes and places of origin matter. . . . Whether a diamond is conflict
free may matter to the fiance´e who wishes not to think of supporting blood-
shed and human rights violations each time she looks at the ring on her
finger.”78
The extraterritorial application of UDAP statutes rarely will be an issue
where the corporation engages in deceptive or misleading communications
regarding its human rights record.  Online press releases or announcements
on company websites that target domestic consumers constitute conduct
within the United States.79  Moreover, unfair labor practices abroad that
adversely affect the domestic market will also overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality.80  However, unfair business practices that only
injure foreign plaintiffs are not covered by state UDAP statutes.81
UDAP statutes are particularly important in challenging representations
as to a corporation’s human rights record.  When retailers misstate their
commitment to social responsibility, such statements are actionable under
these statutes.  For example, labor groups successfully brought claims against
The Gap, Target, JC Penney, and The Limited for labeling garments “Sweat
74 Id. at 262.
75 In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 31–38 (Cal. 2009).
76 See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1122–23 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
77 See Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human
Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 47, 51 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2004), available at http://pa
pers.nber.org/chapters/c9950.pdf; The Consumer and Sweatshops: New Marymount University
Survey Warns Manufacturers/Retailers: Consumers Don’t Want Sweatshop Goods, MARYMOUNT
UNIV., http://connect.marymount.edu/news/garmentstudy/overview.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014).
78 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 889 (Cal. 2011) (footnote omitted).
79 See Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
80 See Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 846 (Cal.
1999); RLH Indus., Inc. v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469, 478–79 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
81 See Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1195–96 (Cal. 2011).
2014] the  future  of  human  rights  litigation  after K I O B E L 1761
Free” when they sourced their products from sweatshops.82  When public
controversy erupts regarding a corporation’s overseas practices, misleading
corporate statements in response to such controversy also can trigger UDAP
litigation.  For example, when labor groups alleged that Nike contracted with
overseas sweatshop suppliers, Nike vigorously defended its practices and
denied the existence of poor labor standards in its overseas factories.  Those
denials led to a section 17200 action alleging that Nike misled the public in
denying the existence of sweatshops.  In 2003, Nike settled for several million
dollars.83
As a result of UDAP statutes, corporations that engage in human rights
abuse have a choice.  They can face public opprobrium by remaining silent
or conceding wrongdoing and be sued for unfair business practices.  Alterna-
tively, they can mislead the public by denying corporate misconduct and be
sued for unfair and deceptive business practices.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TORT LAW
The same facts that give rise to international human rights violations
almost always will also constitute a domestic or foreign tort.  Plaintiffs in ATS
litigation, including the plaintiffs in Kiobel,84 routinely have added pendant
state tort claims.85  Plaintiffs also occasionally present such claims in state
courts, alleging assault, battery, wrongful death, and false imprisonment for
facts that might otherwise be cognizable as international human rights
violations.86
82 See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J.
891, 957 (2008).
83 See Aaron J. Schindel & Jeremy Mittman, Workers Abroad, Trouble at Home: Multina-
tional Employers Face Growing Liability for Labor Violations of Overseas Suppliers, 19 INT’L L.
PRACTICUM 40, 43 (2006); Adam Liptak, Nike Move Ends Case over Firms’ Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/13/us/nike-move-ends-case-
over-firms-free-speech.html.
84 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2000).
85 See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2012); Al-Quraishi
v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d
11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009); Jama v. Esmor Corr.
Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252,
1266–67 (11th Cir. 2009); Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008);
Abagninin v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2008); Arias v. DynCorp, 928
F. Supp. 2d 10, 13 (D.D.C. 2013); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal.
2010);  Julin v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
86 See, e.g., Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 811 So. 2d 98, 100 (La. Ct. App.
2002); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 984 N.E.2d 893, 894–95 (N.Y. 2012); Ruling on
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
on Each of Plaintiffs’ Tort Claims at 2, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002), available at http://dg5vd3ocj3r4t.cloudfront.net/sites/de
fault/files/legal/Unocal-Tort-Liability-MSA-Ruling.pdf; Ruling on Unocal Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment Based on: (1) Absence of Vicarious Liability; and (2) Fail-
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As courts of general jurisdiction, state courts may adjudicate violations of
state or foreign tort laws.  Federal courts also may resolve such claims based
on diversity jurisdiction.  As the Supreme Court noted in Kiobel, the transitory
tort doctrine allows “a party to recover when the cause of action arose in
another civilized jurisdiction” if there is “a well founded belief that it was a
cause of action in that place.”87  The transitory tort doctrine is based on the
theory that, “although the act complained of was subject to no law having
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation . . . which, like other obliga-
tions, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found.”88
Choice of law principles determine whether state or foreign tort laws will
govern the dispute.  There are numerous approaches for resolving choice of
law questions, but in the overwhelming majority of cases foreign law will
apply to resolve disputes between foreign parties regarding torts committed
on foreign soil.89  Courts are more likely to apply domestic law as the jurisdic-
tional nexus increases based on the government interests, the parties’ resi-
dence, the locus of the wrongful conduct, and the locus of resulting
injuries.90
In the terrorism context, for example, courts have applied choice of law
principles to hold defendants responsible for terrorist attacks on foreign
soil.91  If the terrorist attack targeted the United States or the victims were
American nationals, courts typically will apply domestic state tort laws.92  By
ure to Join Indispensable Parties at 4–6, 15, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237
679 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2002).
87 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013).
88 Slater v. Mex. Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); accord Dennick v. R.R., 103 U.S.
11, 18 (1880); McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 241, 248 (1843); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally Bradley, Bradford’s Opinion, supra note 14, at
512 (discussing examples of courts employing the transitory tort doctrine); Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1329, 1342–43 (2013) (stating that the exercise of jurisdiction over cases arising
“between foreigners . . . out of foreign conduct” is consistent with international law); Ralph
G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of
International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2270 (2004)
(discussing the origins of the transitory tort doctrine).
89 Alford, supra note 13 (manuscript at 46–47).
90 Id.; see also Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in
Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 777 (2009) (“[A] judge is most likely to apply domestic law
when the locus of the underlying activity is mostly or all inside U.S. territory and the parties
are mostly or all domestic, and she is least likely to do so when the locus of activity is mostly
or all outside U.S. territory and the parties are mostly or all foreign.  This . . . prediction
decreases . . . as territoriality and personality become more balanced.”).
91 Alford, supra note 13 (manuscript at 5).
92 See Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d 416, 426 (D.D.C. 2007);
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D.D.C. 2007); Blais v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 54 (D.D.C. 2006); Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2006); Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F.
Supp. 2d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2006); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 421 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159
(D.D.C. 2006); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell IV), 404 F. Supp. 2d 261,
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contrast, if the attack targeted other countries and injured foreign nationals,
courts typically will apply foreign tort laws.93  The result has been the applica-
tion of state or foreign tort laws to award billions of dollars to victims of
international terrorism.94
In the transnational context the issue rarely is whether tort laws will sanc-
tion human rights abuse.  According to the International Commission of
Jurists, “in all jurisdictions the law of civil remedies can be invoked to remedy
harm to life, liberty, dignity, physical and mental integrity and property.”95
The more salient question is whether there is an independent and impartial
adjudicator to resolve the dispute.  Litigating foreign torts in the United
States makes sense where there is a legitimate nexus to the forum and no
viable alternatives.  On the other hand, transferring the case to foreign courts
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is appropriate if there is an alter-
native available forum and the balance of public and private interests favors
dismissal.96  By initiating litigation in the United States where domestic
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, and transferring claims to foreign courts
where appropriate, the parties have some assurance that their dispute will be
resolved by an independent adjudicator applying the appropriate law.
Common law state tort laws routinely are applied extraterritorially.97
There are constitutional limits, but those limits are rarely meaningful.98
271 (D.D.C. 2005); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14, 23–24
(D.D.C. 2005); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 384 F. Supp. 2d 120,
132–33 (D.D.C. 2005); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell III), 370 F. Supp.
2d 218, 220–21 (D.D.C. 2005); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Dammarell II), No.
Civ.A. 01-2224JDB, 2005 WL 756090, at *17–21 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005); Salazar v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2005); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic
of Iran (Dammarell I), 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 192–94 (D.D.C. 2003).
93 See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Estate of
Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F. Supp. 2d 218, 223–26 (D.D.C. 2011);
Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96 (D.D.C.
2008).
94 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); In re
Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2009).
95 3 EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INT’L CRIMES, INT’L COMM’N OF
JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL REMEDIES 11 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.icjcanada.org/fr/document/doc_2008-10_vol3.pdf.
96 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1947). See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The
Search for a Convenient Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 164–74 (2012)
(reviewing the doctrine); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institu-
tional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1095–1101 (2010) (discussing effects of the doctrine);
Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1062–80 (2010) (explaining the history of the doctrine).
97 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply
Abroad, 102 GEO. L. J. 301 (2014); Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes:
Understanding the Extraterritorial Effect of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Austra-
lia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535 (2012).
98 See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterri-
toriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1075–82
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Under the Due Process Clause, a state may apply its own laws if it has any
“significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.”99  State choice of
law principles incorporate these constitutional limitations and refrain from
applying state tort laws in the absence of sufficient contacts or interests.100
To the extent these constitutional limits circumscribe the extraterritorial
application of state tort laws, these limitations will simply require the court to
apply foreign tort law.  Thus, even if state tort laws may not regulate the for-
eign conduct of foreign defendants, state courts may adjudicate claims alleg-
ing violations of foreign law.
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AS FOREIGN LAW
Many of the problems raised in Kiobel—including the dispositive issue of
extraterritoriality—could have been avoided had the plaintiffs pled interna-
tional law as part of foreign law instead of federal law. Kiobel focuses on the
question of international law as incorporated in federal common law under
the ATS.  But international law also is incorporated into the laws of other
jurisdictions and can be invoked as foreign law.  To the extent a court applies
choice of law principles to invoke foreign law to resolve a dispute, this
includes the invocation of international law that is part of such foreign law.
As Dinah Shelton has noted, “a court in a dualist state might give direct effect
to international law during litigation involving transnational issues, using
choice of law principles, because the relevant other legal system is a monist
state.”101
(2009); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foun-
dations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992).
99 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).  A different, more stringent
standard under the dormant Commerce Clause applies to the extraterritorial application
of state legislation. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 367–37 (1989); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642–43 (1982). See generally Florey, supra note 98, at 1084–94 (discussing the Edgar extra-
territoriality standard).
100 The Court has declared that another constitutional limitation, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, must be “interpreted against the background of principles developed in
international conflicts law,” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988), perhaps
suggesting that the state laws that are consistent with international principles would satisfy
constitutional limitations. See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe Is Overruled?  Extra-
territorial Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 120–21 (1993).  While both
the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause limit the application of state
law, only the Due Process Clause limits a state’s application abroad. See Donald Earl Chil-
dress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1552 n.161 (2011).
101 Dinah Shelton, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 1,
2 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011).
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Monist states, by definition, recognize international law as automatically
incorporated into domestic law.102  Monism envisions a unitary world legal
system, proclaims the “supremacy of international law in relation to national
law,” treats national and international law as possessing “comparable,
equivalent, or identical subjects, sources, and substantive contents.”103
Dualist states, by contrast, require international treaties to be incorpo-
rated through implementing measures.  Most common law countries follow
the dualist approach.  In the United Kingdom, for example, “[t]reaties to
which the United Kingdom is a party do not automatically become part of
UK law.  They become part of UK law—and hence binding on courts—only
when their contents are enacted into law by Parliament.”104  With respect to
customary international law, however, like most dualist countries, the United
Kingdom follows the doctrine of automatic incorporation.105  As Lord Den-
ning noted, “Seeing that the rules of international law have changed—and
do change—and that the courts have given effect to the changes without any
Act of Parliament, it follows . . . inexorably that the rules of international law,
as existing from time to time, do form part of . . . English law.”106  Other
common law countries follow a similar approach, holding that customary
international law that does not conflict with legislation automatically forms
part of the common law and has direct effect in courts.107
Under the facts of Kiobel, had the plaintiffs invoked international law as
part of Nigerian law rather than part of federal law under the ATS, they
would have avoided any question regarding the extraterritorial application of
federal law.  Relying on international law as part of Nigerian law obviates the
central holding of Kiobel.  Moreover, under the transitory tort doctrine articu-
lated by the Court in Kiobel, the plaintiffs could have pursued an interna-
tional human rights claim under Nigerian law because “the cause of action
arose in another civilized jurisdiction” and there was “a well founded belief
102 See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (8th
ed. 2012); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Concep-
tion, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (1999); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314 (1992); S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-
Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Interpretation in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 510 (2013).
103 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1096–97 (3d
ed. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Stephen C. Neff, United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYS-
TEMS, supra note 101, at 448, 457–58.
105 See CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 67–70; Shelton, supra note 101, at 4, 13.
106 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 at 554 (Eng.).
See generally Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament v. Prime Minister of U.K., [2002] EWHC
(Admin) 2777 (U.K.) (discussing the effect of international law on the British decision to
enter the Iraq War); R (European Roman Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer at Prague
Airport, [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 A.C. 1 (explaining the interaction of British law and
international law on refugees); Neff, supra note 104, at 626–27 (discussing incorporation
of customary international law).
107 See Shelton, supra note 101, at 13.
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that it was a cause of action in that place.”108  The international human
rights claim could have gone forward as a claim arising under Nigerian law.
Nigeria follows the dualist tradition and requires domestic implementa-
tion of treaties.109  Human rights treaties, including the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
have become part of Nigerian law by virtue of implementing legislation.110
The legislation implementing the African Charter, for example, provides that
“the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights . . .
shall . . . have [the] force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition
and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative,
executive or judicial powers in Nigeria.”111  More broadly, when Nigeria
adopted its 1999 constitution it did so with intent to create “enforceable fun-
damental rights” that incorporate “the civil and political rights guaranteed in
major international human rights instruments.”112
With respect to customary international law, Nigeria follows the com-
mon law tradition and adheres to the doctrine of incorporation.  Under that
doctrine, “customary international law is automatically incorporated into
domestic law and requires no further legislation.”113  Nigeria has “a dualist
system, albeit with some monist considerations, which uses the doctrine of
incorporation in relation to customary international law.”114  As the Nigerian
Supreme Court put it in Ibidapo v. Lufthansa Airlines, “Nigeria . . . inherited
the English common law rules governing the municipal application of inter-
national law.”115
This approach reflects the indirect application of international law
through the vehicle of foreign law.  The federal court in Kiobel could have
relied on New York’s choice of law rules to apply Nigerian law.  In circum-
stances in which the plaintiffs and defendants have split domiciles, New
York’s choice of law principles almost certainly would have resulted in the
application of Nigerian law as the lex loci delicti.116  It could have then applied
108 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013).
109 See Babafemi Akinrinade, Nigeria, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYS-
TEMS, supra note 101, at 448, 457–58.
110 See id. at 457–60.
111 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act
(1983) Cap. (A9) (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/African%20Charter%
20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%27%20Rights.htm.
112 Jacob Abiodun Dada, Human Rights Under the Nigerian Constitution: Issues and
Problems, 2 INT’L J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 33, 37 (2012).
113 Akinrinade, supra note 109, at 461.
114 Id. at 467.
115 Ibidapo v. Lufthansa Airlines, [1997] 4 NWLR 124, 150 (Nigeria).
116 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972); see also Gould Elecs.
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (detailing choice of choice of law
rules under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co., 952 N.E.2d
1033, 1037 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that lex loci delecti is default); Cooney v. Osgood Mach.,
Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1993) (noting that in theory the laws of the location of the
injury create the legal right of redress); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679,
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international law as part of Nigerian law.  Thus, under this approach, the
plaintiffs in Kiobel could use New York’s choice of law rules to rely on Niger-
ian law, including international law incorporated therein.
VII. HUMAN RIGHTS AS COMMON LAW
Reading the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel in light of its earlier
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain leads to the following syllogism: if (1)
there is a limited category of federal common law claims actionable for viola-
tions of the law of nations; and (2) the statutory canon limits the extraterrito-
rial reach of the ATS, not the underlying common law claims; then (3) the
common law claims may be pursued in federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction or state courts exercising general jurisdiction.
The first premise is that the ATS does not create a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations, the common law does.  In Sosa the Court held
that the ATS, although only a jurisdictional statute, was “enacted on the
understanding that that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for per-
sonal liability.”117  It then held that
no development in the two centuries from the enactment of § 1350 . . . has
categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the
law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any rele-
vant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another
statute.118
For such a common law claim to be actionable, however, it must be
“based on the present-day law of nations” and “rest on a norm of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have recog-
nized.”119  The Court in Kiobel reinforced this understanding of a “modest
number” of federal common law claims actionable for violations of the law of
nations.120  In other words, both Sosa and Kiobel confirm that the ATS is not
the source or the limit for common law claims involving international law
violations.
The second premise is that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute and that
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies only to the statute, not to
the underlying federal common law claims for violations of the law of
nations. In Kiobel the Court declared that “the presumption against extrater-
682–83 (N.Y. 1985) (noting the locus is the location of the last wrong); Alford, supra note
13 (manuscript at 32).
117 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
118 Id. at 724–25.
119 Id. at 725.
120 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).  The ATS pro-
vides jurisdiction to hear claims “but does not expressly provide any causes of action.” Id.
The common law provides “a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law
violations” and “courts may recognize private claims [for such violations] under federal
common law.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ritoriality . . . constrain[s] courts exercising their power under the ATS.”121
That presumption, the Court said, is “a canon of statutory interpretation”
that assumes that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterri-
torial application, it has none.”122  The purpose of the canon is to avoid
“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations” by requir-
ing Congress to manifest a clear intent to regulate conduct abroad.123
Although the ATS “does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief,” the
Court concluded that “we think the principles underlying the canon of inter-
pretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be
brought under the ATS.”124  The Court then looked to the text, history, and
purpose of the ATS to determine whether Congress intended for the ATS to
apply abroad and found “nothing in the statute [to] rebut[ the] presump-
tion.”125  Had there been such evidence, the jurisdictional statute would
apply extraterritorially without altering the content or reach of the underly-
ing common law claims.  Should Congress amend the ATS so that it applies
extraterritorially, this too would not alter the content or reach of the underly-
ing common law claims.  Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to limit Congress’s grant of jurisdictional authority to adjudicate fed-
eral common law claims for violations of the law of nations.
The surprising conclusion one draws from these two premises is that
federal common law claims actionable for violations of the law of nations still
may be pursued in federal courts exercising foreign diversity jurisdiction or
state courts exercising general jurisdiction.  As for the former, foreign diver-
sity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires a $75,000 amount in
controversy and the inclusion of a U.S. citizen either as a plaintiff or defen-
dant.126  The typical “foreign-cubed” facts pursued in ATS claims would be
foreclosed under this grant of jurisdiction.  However, where a U.S. citizen is
involved in a diversity action, the federal common law claims recognized in
Sosa may survive Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality.  The pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality will apply to the diversity jurisdiction stat-
ute as well, but it is uncontroversial that “federal courts may exercise foreign
diversity jurisdiction over tort claims by aliens against U.S. citizens for acts
occurring outside the United States.”127  As others in this issue have argued:
“[e]ven after Sosa and Kiobel, aliens will be able to sue U.S. citizens in federal
court for a wide range of torts regardless of whether they compare favorably
to the Blackstone crimes or whether they occurred in the United States.”128
121 Id. at 1665.
122 Id. at 1664 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1669.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
127 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609, 1639 (2014).
128 Id. at 1642.
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On the other hand, there are persuasive reasons to believe this syllogism
may be wrong.  “As a general matter, the presumption against extraterritori-
ality does not apply to jurisdictional statutes,”129 and the Court in Kiobel sug-
gested that the presumption applied not just to the statute but also to the
“causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.”130  Moreover, the
Court in Sosa expressly excluded the possibility that federal common law
claims under the ATS could be brought under other jurisdictional statutes,
such as federal question jurisdiction.131  If the Sosa causes of action do not
create federal question jurisdiction, there is no reason to think those same
federal causes of action could be brought under diversity jurisdiction.
State courts sitting as courts of general jurisdiction may resolve the fed-
eral common law claims recognized in Sosa.  Unless one interprets the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality articulated in Kiobel as limiting the
underlying common law claims rather than the jurisdictional statute, the
international law claims that heretofore were pursued in federal court under
the ATS still could be pursued in state court as federal common law claims.
There is nothing unusual in suggesting that federal common law claims may
be adjudicated in state courts.  State courts routinely apply and make federal
common law, including claims involving admiralty and implicating the rights
and obligations of the United States.132
Finally, assuming the Court’s application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies both to the ATS and the underlying federal com-
mon law claims, there remains the possibility that state courts could fashion
state common law claims based on the criteria established in Sosa. State law
routinely mirrors comparable federal law, including the RICO and UDAP
statutes outlined above.  There is nothing in Sosa or Kiobel that prevents a
state court from recognizing a state cause of action for violations of “a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms,” such as
piracy, violations of safe conducts, or offenses against ambassadors.133  Nor is
there anything unusual with state law incorporating international law or
applying choice of law principles so that state common law claims have
greater extraterritorial reach than federal law.134  Courts applying the com-
mon law already have established gradations of torts that embrace negli-
gence, gross negligence, intentional torts, and strict liability.  There is no
129 William Dodge, Guest Post: Dodge—The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not
Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris
.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-dodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-stat
utes/.
130 Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1664.
131 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004).
132 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 825, 839–840 (2005).
133 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
134 Anthony Colangelo, Guest Post:  Colangelo—Kiobel and Conflicts of Law, OPINIO JURIS
(Jan. 28, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-colangelo-kiobel-
conflicts-law/.
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logical reason that an international law violation could not be a state com-
mon law cause of action, or at a minimum a critical factor in the determina-
tion of liability or damages under state law.
To suggest that the statutory presumption against extraterritoriality does
not apply to federal common law claims (or similar state common law claims)
is not to suggest the absence of territorial limits.  As with the extraterritorial
application of state laws, the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause
prevent state courts from applying common law claims in the absence of any
“significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.”135  Nor is there any
reason to think courts resolving common law claims for international law
violations would go so far as to violate international limits of prescriptive
jurisdiction.  Both constitutional and international law impose obligations of
a territorial nexus separate and apart from the statutory presumption against
extraterritoriality.  The territorial limits of common law claims for interna-
tional law violations are derived from constitutional and international law,
not canons of statutory interpretation.
VIII. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FALSE CONFLICTS
If international law is incorporated into the national laws of all relevant
jurisdictions, then this may result in what conflict of law scholars describe as a
“false conflict,” allowing the forum court to apply domestic law where it is
identical to foreign law.  In essence, this doctrine holds that if the competing
laws are the same, there is no need to choose between them.136  Under New
York’s choice of law principles that would have applied in Kiobel, “[t]he first
step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine
whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions
involved.”137  Laws are in conflict where “the applicable law from each juris-
diction provides different substantive rules.”138  Where the laws of competing
135 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). See generally Florey, supra note
98, at 1084–94 (discussing the prohibition on extraterritoriality under the dormant Com-
merce Clause).
136 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 537 F. Supp 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2008); Gulf Grp. Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt.
Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  A variation of this false conflict analysis
that is applied in the government interest approach to conflict of laws looks to whether all
competing states have an interest in applying their own laws.  If only one involved state has
an interest in applying its law, there is a “false conflict.” See Brainerd Currie, The Constitu-
tion and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9,
10 (1958).
137 In re Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stolarz, 613 N.E.2d 936, 937 (N.Y. 1993).
138 Finance One Public Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 331 (2d
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12
(2d Cir. 1998); Elson v. Defren, 726 N.Y.S.2d 407, 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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jurisdictions are not in conflict and “New York law is among the relevant
choices, New York courts are free to apply it.”139
The harmonization of national laws achieved by international law
reduces the conflict of laws.  In fields such as intellectual property and con-
tacts, for example, substantive treaty guarantees under the Berne Convention
and the Convention on the International Sale of Goods have reduced the
number of true conflicts between jurisdictions.140  Likewise, the Warsaw Con-
vention and subsequent protocols have reduced conflicts between national
laws with respect to airline liability for torts.141
In the human rights context, to the extent the same international law is
part of domestic and foreign law, there is no true conflict between those laws.
In the absence of a conflict between the potentially applicable foreign law
and domestic law, the forum is free to apply domestic law.  In other words, it
is quite plausible that a federal district court in Kiobel could have applied
federal common law claims alleging violations of the law of nations—not
because it governed the dispute—but because there was no conflict between
the international law incorporated in domestic law and the international law
incorporated in Nigerian law.  Absent a need to choose, courts are free to
apply international law as incorporated in the ATS.
This false conflict analysis suggests there is no basis for applying a pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.  As the Court noted in Kiobel, the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality “ ‘serves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.’”142  But when domestic and foreign law is the same,
then by definition there is no clash between those laws.  International law
incorporated in domestic law is applied only because it is identical to interna-
tional law incorporated into foreign law.
Anthony Colangelo has argued something similar in the context of uni-
versal jurisdiction of international law violations:
Because the State exercising universal jurisdiction merely enforces shared
normative and legal commitments of all, no conflict of laws exists since the
law being applied is the same everywhere. . . . [T]he State exercising univer-
sal jurisdiction does not extend extraterritorially its own national laws, but
139 Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2004).
140 See AMCO Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–94 (E.D. Pa.
2004); Product Liability Claims on Both Sides of the Border: A Panel Discussion, 8 U.S.–MEX. L.J.
123, 132 (2000) (arguing there is a false conflict where the CISG would apply under both
Mexican and American law); see also Paul Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases:
Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315, 322 (2004) (stating as a
result of the Berne Convention and subsequent treaties, copyright laws have converged
worldwide, resulting in false conflicts).
141 See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 921–22 (9th Cir. 1999);
D’Alessandro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309–10 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
142 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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instead applies through domestic process a universally applicable interna-
tional law that covers the globe.143
Colangelo argues that a false conflict analysis removes sovereignty claims
because states are applying norms that by force of international law apply
within the jurisdictions of all other interested states.144  But the false conflict
analysis need not be limited to claims involving universal jurisdiction.  As he
argues elsewhere, “False conflicts thus should be the starting point for any
evaluation of international human rights claims in state court under state
law.”145  If, and only if, the relevant jurisdictions have incorporated the same
substantive international norm into domestic law, then there is no conflict
between competing sovereigns and no basis to fear unintended clashes
between foreign and domestic laws.
CONCLUSION
The ATS has never been an effective tool to resolve international human
rights violations.  It has captivated the imagination of scholars and lawyers,
but rarely provided actual relief for victims.146  The statute’s struggle to sur-
vive ended with the presumption that it does not apply abroad.
The question presented by this Article is whether the demise of the ATS
will occasion the creative exploration of alternative avenues for relief.  Put-
ting aside the possibility of litigation in foreign or international courts, there
is every reason to expect that plaintiffs will continue to pursue human rights
litigation in the United States.  Some but not all of these avenues require a
significant territorial nexus to the United States.  Some but not all of these
avenues require novel applications of international law.
The options outlined in this Article are based on conjecture and specu-
lation.  Some of these avenues for relief are more plausible than others.
None can be dismissed out of hand.  Each demands further reflection.  Only
after years of litigation will one be able to fully assess Kiobel’s impact on
human rights litigation and the viability of alternative avenues for relief.
143 Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws,
30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 883, 924 (2009).
144 See id. at 883.
145 Anthony Colangelo, International Law in U.S. State Courts:  Extraterritoriality and “False
Conflicts” of Law, AMER. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 15) (on file
with author).
146 See DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION 193 (2009) (referring to the statute as
“an extremely limited, highly conditional, litigable instrument of last resort”); Harold
Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 263, 269 (2004) (describing the various barriers to recovery under the ATS).
